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10 September 1965

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# CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

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
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India-Pakistan: (Information as of 4:30 AM EDT)

No major military gains were registered by either side in yesterday's heavy fighting, but there were indications that the warfare along the Punjab border may intensify with both sides throwing in units heretofore held in reserve.

A Pakistani counterattack in the Lahore area, launched on 8 September, appears to have halted the Indian advance there and may have thrown the Indian forces back across the border in some sectors.

[Lead units penetrated a considerable distance across the Indian border. The initial Indian attack toward Lahore apparently consisted of about four brigades, leaving the Indian 1st Armored Division and the equivalent of nearly three infantry divisions in reserve, which New Delhi would almost certainly order into action if faced with major military defeat in the Lahore-Amritsar area.]


The two-pronged Indian attack toward Sialkot from Jammu and the Jessar area thirty miles north of Amritsar may represent a major Indian effort to cut off the Pakistani brigades involved in the 1 September thrust toward Akhnur. [The US Army Attaché in New Delhi speculates that the Indian forces committed to the Sialkot attack may include the 26th Infantry Division at Jammu, two independent brigades in the Punjab, and an armored brigade.]

[the Indian 10th Division has moved from its regular station in Southern India to Pathankot in the Punjab, adding about 12,000 troops to the forces available for the attack on Sialkot. Sketchy reports indicate that the Indian advance toward Sialkot from the southeast has made little progress, while the forces attacking from Jammu are within artillery range of Sialkot.]

On the Rajasthan front farther south, Indian forces do not appear to have advanced beyond their initial gain of six miles. The Indians do not appear to be committing a significant number of troops to the move toward Hyderabad and it is doubtful that their plans call for taking the

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city. A Pakistani spokesman said that a "massive counterattack" was in the making, but Pakistan probably has little more than a brigade in the area.]

Trucks full of tribal irregulars reportedly were leaving Peshawar yesterday. Their mission is not clear, but Pakistan may hope to use them to augment forces in the Lahore and Sialkot areas by patrolling rear areas, guarding prisoners, or even serving as a reserve force for the regulars.

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[Indian army units began moving into forward positions on 8 September along the East Pakistan border, replacing border police. The border police, normally subordinate to the state governments, have been placed under Indian Army command to provide rear support for the army units on the border.]

[The Indian Defense Ministry has directed the Navy to draw up plans for a sea blockade of Pakistan, ]

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[India is probably concerned that military aid may be offered to Pakistan by such countries as Indonesia, Turkey, and Iran, and that the materiel will be shipped by sea.] The Indians are detaining all Pakistani ships in Indian ports as hostages for two Indian merchant ships reportedly seized in Karachi.

[Pakistani Foreign Minister Bhutto, when told by our ambassador that the US was concerting its resources behind UN peace efforts, said that if the only reason for the US-Pakistan bilateral agreement was to refer Pakistan to the UN, "then Pakistan might as well not have that agreement." Bhutto reiterated Pakistan's demand that India withdraw from Kashmir--which Bhutto apparently now regards as part of Pakistan--and said that if India wouldn't agree, "then let them destroy Pakistan."]

President Kaunda of Zambia reportedly said yesterday that negotiations were in progress concerning the composition of a commonwealth peace team, and that he had suggested Britain, Nigeria, Kenya, Tanzania,

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and New Zealand as members. Its formation may be announced soon.

Chou En-Lai continued the Chinese propaganda effort aimed at shaking Indian resolve in the conflict by "sternly warning" New Delhi yesterday that India must bear responsibility for "all the consequences arising from its extended aggression." Chou followed in the pattern of other Chinese statements on the crisis by avoiding any specific threat of Chinese action. He emphasized charges that the US and the USSR were particularly responsible for India's "large scale armed attack on Pakistan." He charged that the Indian "military venture" would not have been possible without US consent and support and that recent Soviet statements regarding Kashmir encouraged India to carry out military operations against Pakistan.

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\*Dominican Republic: With the ouster of General Elias Wessin y Wessin on 9 September the provisional government appears to have weathered its first major crisis.

Provisional President Garcia Godoy said in a speech last night that Wessin had been retired and that he had accepted the post of Dominican Consul-General in Miami. Until shortly before his departure last night aboard a US Air Force plane bound for Panama, the former commander of the Armed Forces Training Center had openly defied an order by Garcia Godoy to leave the country or retire. Wessin failed in his efforts to gain support from the other military leaders who continued to accept the President's decision that the departure of the controversial general was necessary "to achieve a climate of peace."

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[redacted] a majority of officers and enlisted men disagreed with the handling and timing of Wessin's ouster.] Garcia Godoy's statement last night that his government has decided not to make changes in the leadership of the armed forces at present, however, may reduce military opposition to the provisional government.

It is expected that the provisional regime will now turn its attention to the disarmament of the rebel zone. Until now, rebel leaders have made their compliance with the Act of Reconciliation, which calls for the disarmament of the rebel militia, dependent upon the departure of Wessin.

[Meanwhile, leaders of the Communist Dominican Popular Movement (MFD), in preparation for a guerrilla warfare campaign, have been reconnoitering the countryside in the northern province of Puerto Plata [redacted]

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[redacted] the MFD has recently accepted a Communist Chinese offer to train MFD members in guerrilla warfare in China.] [redacted]

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Venezuela: Disruptive ideological differences within the Venezuelan Communist Party (PCV) and the Communist-dominated Armed Forces of National Liberation (FALN) appear to be increasing sharply.]

Hostility directed toward "soft-liners" in the party is now reported in both the party proper and the FALN, its paramilitary arm. A small, tightly knit group of "soft-line" members is attempting to create a movement of sufficient strength within the PCV to replace the "hard-line" leadership. Their quarrel is basically over the degree of emphasis to be placed on armed struggle as opposed to achievement of party aims by political means.]

Meanwhile, the party's politburo is also under attack from the other side. Some of the more radical hard-line members of the FALN believe the politburo has compromised with the soft-liners. The imminent return to Venezuela of one of the FALN's hard-line leaders, who has been representing the organization in Cuba, could signal trouble. He has reportedly threatened to "unseat" the PCV politburo.]

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GATT: [A serious threat is shaping up in GATT to the US position against granting tariff preferences to less developed countries.]

[The challenge is likely to arise next week when a GATT working party considers an Australian plan to give selected less developed countries (LDCs) preferential access to the Australian market. The plan would require a GATT waiver to forestall possible retaliation against Australia by other GATT contracting parties which might consider their interests hurt.]

[Should the Australians press for a waiver, US opposition in GATT could be overruled by the LDCs. Some of the developed countries favor some sort of preferences for the LDCs and would probably not oppose a waiver. The impending US-Canadian agreement on free trade for automotive equipment has been cited by some--most recently by Japan--as weakening the US argument against preferences.]

[The GATT secretary general has agreed with the French delegate that the outvoting of a major trading power on an important issue would be "disastrous for the GATT." He is apparently trying to avoid a waiver vote by recommending the establishment of an over-all system of waivers for preferences to LDCs "under certain prescribed circumstances." Such a system, however, would presumably not apply to the US-Canadian agreement.]

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Brazil: [President Castello Branco appears increasingly inclined toward proposing indirect election of the next president by Congress.]

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Castello Branco believes such a change may be necessary to assure that Governor Carlos Lacerda, now the leading candidate, does not gain the presidency in the November 1966 election. Castello Branco considers Lacerda too rash and not sufficiently dedicated to continuing the reform policies of the present administration.

[A constitutional amendment providing for such a change would not be placed before Congress until October at the earliest,]  
Presumably, the outcome of the gubernatorial elections on 3 October will influence Castello Branco's final decision.]

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[An administration effort to revamp basic electoral procedures would probably evoke considerable resistance in Congress from many of the regime's adherents as well as the opposition. Some elements of the military, particularly supporters of Lacerda, would also strongly resent such a proposal.]

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France: De Gaulle's criticism of the EEC and NATO in his press conference yesterday is intended to establish a firm French position prior to important negotiations in which he hopes to weaken the supranational aspects of both organizations.

In a direct slap at the EEC Commission, De Gaulle emphasized that all future decisions of consequence must be taken by the national governments. He tied France's withdrawal from EEC activities to his opposition to its supranational development. He stressed the importance to France of achieving a common agricultural policy but implied that settlement of this issue should be on a government-to-government basis.

De Gaulle's statement that France will not permit its hands to be tied by the majority voting provisions of the treaty due to come into effect in 1966 is a further indication that resumption of French participation will depend on some modification of these provisions. There is strong opposition to this among the other EEC members, however, and [redacted]

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[redacted] France might accept a "gentleman's agreement" not to override any one nation rather than require direct treaty amendment.]

By stating that France's "subordination" to NATO must be ended by 1969 "at the latest," De Gaulle reiterated his broad opposition to the structure of the organization without putting forth any precise changes. [In the past he has indicated that future military relationships between France and the US will have to be negotiated and conducted on a bilateral basis.]

The French President's general references to Kashmir and the need for neutralizing Southeast Asia indicate he sees no important role for France to play in either situation at this time.

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De Gaulle refused to answer a question on whether he would run for another term in the presidential election on 5 December. His references to the need for continued political stability and the importance he attached to settlement of the EEC and NATO questions, however, appear to indicate that he does intend to be around to see French interests defended.

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Colombia: Two high-ranking members of the Colombian Communist Party--Marxist/Leninist (PCC-ML) are leaving for Communist China on 21 September and are scheduled to bring back a large sum of money for the party's activities,

The PCC-ML, having broken with the orthodox Communist Party, has been seeking funds for guerrilla activity and urban terrorism, which it has already begun on a small scale.

Colombia: The government apparently intends to permit a rally of transport workers to be conducted in Bogota today by Camilo Torres, a defrocked priest who has been inciting strikers and other discontented groups to rebellion "by force if necessary." The authorities probably believe that it will be easier to contain the demonstration than to prevent it. Communist Party leaders have instructed their followers to support Torres, and the Communists probably are the prime organizers of the rally which was called to protest a proposed gasoline tax.

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The Under Secretary of State

The Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs

The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs

The Counselor and Chairman of the Policy Planning Council

The Director of Intelligence and Research

The Treasury Department

The Secretary of the Treasury

The Under Secretary of the Treasury

The Department of Defense

The Secretary of Defense

The Deputy Secretary of Defense

The Secretary of the Army

The Secretary of the Navy

The Secretary of the Air Force

The Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs)

The Assistant Secretary of Defense

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Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy

Chief of Staff, United States Air Force

Chief of Staff, United States Army

Commandant, United States Marine Corps

U.S. Rep., Military Committee and Standing Group, NATO

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Commander in Chief, Pacific

Commander in Chief, Atlantic

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The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army

The Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy

The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force

The Department of Justice

The Attorney General

The Federal Bureau of Investigation

The Director

National Aeronautics and Space Administration

The Administrator

The Atomic Energy Commission

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The National Security Agency

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